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In summer 2003, 11 young men (mostly from the Washington metropolitan area) were arrested and charged with conspiring to wage war against an ally of the United States, namely India. The case was commonly referred to by the media as the “Virginia Jihad Network” or the “Virginia 11”

Federal prosecutors alleged that the group was preparing to join the Lashkar-e-Taiba, a militant group that is fighting Indian occupation of Kashmir. Scores of homes and offices were raided and many Muslims were detained and questioned (some for several months) in the course of the federal action.

Many legal experts say the government built its case on circumstantial evidence and tenuous associations. For example, the group of Muslim men who were rounded-up, most in their late twenties and early thirties, gathered to play a popular recreational game called ‘Paintball’; prosecutors alleged that the Paintball games these men played were in fact used for more nefarious reasons -- military training for Jihad. At this point it is important to note that the very definition of Jihad is disputed by the government and the defense of the indicted men.

Six of the 11 defendants plead guilty to lesser charges early this year; their sentences range from two to twenty years. Statements made by some of the men led prosecutors to submit new, more serious charges against the remaining 5 defendants — charges linking some of them to Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Many legal experts who followed this case, agree that the ‘Virginia Jihad Network’ it is politically motivated.

Of the five defendants who maintained their innocence and who went to trial this month, three were convicted of conspiracy and weapons charges that carry mandatory federal sentences. Masoud Ahmad Khan, Seifullah Chapman, and Hammad Abdur-Raheem face jail time of about 90, 30, and 15 years respectively when they were sentenced in June 2004. Sabri BenKahla and Caliph Basha were acquitted of all charges.

Pled Guilty
Randall Todd Royer (Did not testify against anyone)
Yong Kwon (A government cooperator)
Khawaja Hassan (A government cooperator)
Donald Surratt (Testified with inconsistencies)
Mohamed Aatique (A government cooperator)
Ibrahim Alhamdi (Did not testify in Al-Timimi’s trial)

Pled Not Guilty

Masoud Khan (Convicted)
Seifullah Chapman (Convicted)
Hammad Abdur-Raheem (Convicted)
Caliph Basha (Acquitted)
Sabri Benkahla (Acquitted)

United States Vs. Ali Al-Timimi

Almost two years later, a scientist and a Muslim scholar, Ali Al-Timimi was on trial — not for committing acts of terror, but for allegedly encouraging others to kill American soldiers in Afghanistan. Prosecutors alleged that only days after the attacks on 9/11, Al-Timimi urged a group of Virginia men to attend terrorist training camps in Kashmir in order to fight American soldiers in Afghanistan. Al-Timimi's alleged statements were made at a dinner on September 16th 2001 in the apartment of Yong Kwon at which six members of the the so-called Virginia Jihad Network were in attendance. The names of the six attendees (of the September 16th dinner) are as follows: Randall Todd Royer a/k/a Ismail Royer, Khawaja Mahmood Hassan, Masoud Ahmad Khan, Mohammed Aatique, Hammad Abdur-Raheem, and Caliph Basha. Some alleged members of this group did indeed receive training and already have been convicted on terrorism related charges.

Free Speech

From the day Al-Timimi was indicted, the government (with the help of their media collaborators) impressed, upon the court and the American public, the idea that this case was about the First Amendment and that the court had to decide whether or not the alleged statements made by Al-Timimi were in fact crossing the boundaries and limitations set by the First Amendment. The government, along with media collaboration, tried to confuse the masses – it seems -- by constantly repeating that Al-Timimi’s case was about Free speech and whether or not his alleged statements were indeed protected by the First Amendment. If the answer to these Federal allegations was yes then Al-Timimi would certainly be found innocent. If, however, his alleged statements would exceed the bounds of the First Amendment then he would surely be found guilty.

Deceived Masses

The masses, or the American public for all intents and purposes, were deceived by the controversy surrounding such a First Amendment debate -- which in reality had nothing to do with the case, or even the First Amendment for that matter. Rather, this case centered around the question of whether or not Al- Timimi, days after 9/11, urged a group of young men from the Washington Metropolitan Area to go attend terrorist training camps in Kashmir in order to fight American soldiers in Afghanistan. If Al-Timimi did, as the government alleged, he would then be declared guilty by the very admission of the defense itself. However, if Al-Timimi did not urge a group of Virginia men to go to terrorist training camps in Kashmir in order to fight Americans in Afghanistan then the whole case should have been dismissed. The whole case, United States vs. Ali Al-Timimi, can be summarized in these few sentences mentioned above.

Throughout the trial the defense constantly denied that Ali Al-Timimi ever urged the Virginia men to go to terrorist camps in Kashmir to train to fight American forces in Afghanistan. Such a denial by Al-Timimi's defense was not only made after his indictment but rather a year before when the 11 Virginia men were first indicted. In May of 2003 Al-Timimi was interviewed by an investigative journalist for NBC, Lisa Myers, in the days immediately following indictment of the 11 men. In the interview with Myers, Al-Timimi denied urging anyone to indulge in Jihad or violence of any kind. What follows is brief portion of the interview:

Lisa Myers: Did you ever tell these men to go abroad and join in violent jihad?
Ali al-Timimi: "No. Never."
Myers: Why would someone make all this up about you?
Al-Timimi: "Perhaps certain people in the government, in a zeal to silence outspoken Muslims in North America, have pushed an investigation further than it really should go."

This clearly shows that the defense initially did not approach this case as one dealing with the First Amendment – or solely with the First Amendment -- but rather approached it with a different strategy stressing the fact that Ali Al-Timimi never made statements urging anyone, let alone members of the “Virginia 11,” to indulge in Jihad (or any acts of violence) but only urged the men to make Hijra –migration – if they felt that they would be unable to deal with the emotional climate against Muslims living in the United States following the September 11th attacks.

Government Witnesses (COOPERATORS)

As the trial began, Federal prosecutors began to bring their witnesses to testify against Al-Timimi. To the surprise of both the defense and the prosecution, the testimony of the witnesses only seemed to strengthen Al-Timimi's case . Nabil AbuGharbia, an old student of Al-Timimi denied that Al-Timimi ever preached violence.

The prosecution’s next witness, Donald Surratt, who has previously struck a guilty plea, was an even bigger surprise in that he seemed to have violated his plea agreement by making certain statements that only strengthened the defense's case as well. Surratts plea agreement stipulated that he would fully cooperate with the Federal Government however his testimony, in Al-Timimi's trail, made it seem that he was a key witness for the defense rather than the prosecution.

At that point, the government called Evan Kohlmann, the “Doogie Howser” of terrorism (as he is known widely in the media) as their key expert witness. As a government witness Kohlmann had very little to do with the actual case except to scare the jury with certain erroneous statements concerning Islamic groups in the United States and elsewhere. During the defense cross examination, Kohlmann admitted that he had contractual obligations with the government and did in fact get paid by the government since he stated that he has, “bills to pay.” So much for Kohlmann's impartiality.

The mood of the trial seemed to have been in favor of the defense since they had reached the core of the matter rather than indulging in the First Amendment confusion caused by the Prosecution and the media.

Finally, prosecutors called their most valuable witness, Yong Kee Kwon – a Korean convert to Islam – who returned to the United States from Korea to avoid any harm that could have befallen his parents for not cooperating with the government. Kwon publicly admitted to having been threatened by Korean authorities if he refused to return to the United States. “Go back to the United States if you know what’s good for your family,” said a Korean official according to Kwon.

Kwon testified that Al-Timimi addressed a group of individuals gathered at a meeting on September 16th, 2001. Kwon stated that Al-Timimi told the young men to migrate and train in Kashmir in order to fight U.S. troops in Afghanistan and elsewhere. Federal prosecutors were overjoyed with Kwon’s testimony and the media referred to him as the government's “star witness.” However, it was only when Kwon was cross-examined by the defense that he admitted a long-standing fascination with military combat and violence. Kwon said that he watched "over and over" a video clip of a Muslim rebel leader in Chechnya executing a wounded Russian soldier. He also said he frequently played a violent video game called "Counter Strike" that allows players to assume the role of terrorists. He testified that he tried unsuccessfully to configure the game so that a picture of Osama bin Laden would emerge when he won various stages of the game, as he had seen other online players do the same. Kwon said he never discussed the video clip or the video game with Al-Timimi.

Kwon also admitted that well before Sept. 11 he had urged his friends — who often got together to play paintball in the Virginia woods — to train with Lashkar-e-Taiba so they might be able to fight in Kashmir, Chechnya or other hot spots in the Muslim world. Kwon also stated that he never discussed those recruiting efforts with Al-Timimi. At this point the trial seemed to be very much in favor of the defense as Al-Timimi’s lawyers argued successfully that anyone who already possessed a desire to train with Lashkar-e-Taiba could not then subsequently be “urged” by Al-Timimi to go and train with the group. Al-Timimi’s lawyers seemed to have proved to the jury that it is not possible to urge or compel anyone into training with, or joining, a particular Jihadist group who already has an urge for training.

There are other (major) areas of concern that still remain with regards to Kwon's credibilty as a “star witness” for the government as well.

1) Kwon admitted to have lied to the on numerous occasions. Would not this make him a liar?
2) Kwon has admitted that he hoped for a reduction in sentence by testifying against other individuals in a number of other cases (unrelated to Al-Timimi's).

Therefore, should one who has a considerable stake in testifying against others even be regarded as credible witness – let alone a “star witness”?

The biggest surprise of all may have been that Randall Todd Royer, the alleged “ring leader” of the Virginia Jihad Network, hasn't even testified against Al-Timimi which further strengthened that defense claim that Royer was actually the key party with extensive Lashkar-e-Taiba contacts that facilitated trips by members of the groups (Virginia 11) to militant training camps – not Al-Timimi.

Masoud Khan and Hammad Abdur-Raheem have publicly denied that Al-Timimi ever urged members of the group to attend terrorist training camps in Kashmir with the purpose of fighting American soldiers in Afghanistan. As a result of their denials the two were not called by the government to testify against Al-Timimi. Ismail Royer, a key figure in this case, has not been called by the government either which raises significant questions with respect to government claims regarding the validity of the September 16th dinner.

Caliph Basha, an aquitted member of the “Virginia 11.” was present for the dinner but fell asleep which the defense argued was undoubtedly quite peculiar. The defense mentioned that the alleged Al-Timimi September 16th address was referred to as “barn-burning” speech. It would be quite strange for Basha to go to sleep if in fact such a “barn-burning” speech was being delivered and all those in attendance were being riled up.

Only three of the six individuals have testified that Al-Timimi urged them to attend terrorist training camps in Kashmir in order to fight American soldiers in Afghanistan; even though, there are numerous inconsistencies in their testimonies.

During closing statements, the defense “challenged” the government with five questions:

1.Why did Kwon order jackets (mentioned a part of the conspiracy in the indictment) before the September 16 dinner?
2.Why did Aatique drive all the way from Pennsylvania unless there was some sort of preplanning prior to Al-Timimi's coincidental visit to Kwon's apartment?
3.Why did others amongst the attendees bring an outdoor store catalog which had a jacket that was designed for the extreme weather/climate of the Himalayas?
4.Was it a coincidence that everyone invited to the dinner was already aware of a group known as Lashkar-e-Taiba (LET)?
5.Do the phone records show that Al-Timimi was planning this meeting?

According to phone records, Kwon invited all those present at the dinner and ordered the food for them. Al-Timimi called Kwon for an unrelated matter and Kwon invited him for the dinner. Al-Timimi arrived at Kwon's apartment after everyone else had already arrived, had dinner, and then left before everyone else. What is interesting to note here is that he government provided no direct response to the defense challenges.

The Defense’s Consistent Strategy

After Federal Prosecutors rested their case, the defense called Yusuf Jaffer, a lecturer at the Center for Islamic Information and Education (Dar al Arqam) to testify. The defense regarded Yusuf Jaffer to be a highly credible witness. Jaffer testified that Al-Timimi actually tried, directly and indirectly, to persuade some of the men -- the same men whom would later plead guilty (plea bargain) with the government -- not to travel.

The government’s case was severely affected by Jaffer’s testimony which then led them to call Khawaja Mahmood Hassan -- another one of the government’s witnesses who had struck a guilty plea in exchange for a lesser sentence. Hassan claimed that on the September 16th dinner, Al-Timimi showed the individuals a document in Arabic authored by Islamic scholar, Hamood Al-Uqla, and that Uqla's religious edict (fatwa) justified the actions committed on 9/11. However, during cross examination Hassan admitted that the first time he ever saw the Al-Uqla fatwa was when the FBI showed it to him during his interrogation and cooperation with the F.B.I. Hassan further admitted that the only reason he claimed he saw it with Al-Timimi was because FBI agents asked him to say this.

A Confused Jury With An Even More Confusing Verdict

The whole trial proceeding only demonstrated that the government charged Al-Timimi with urging others to engage in acts of violence whereas the defense unremittingly denied such allegations. Debate over the First Amendment was never an issue but was in fact constantly used in the court to confuse the jury and the American public as in order to grab media attention.

If such a premise is correct, then Al-Timimi is convicted due to the vacuum of confusion created by the government and the media making people believe that the case was somehow about the First Amendment. The Defense believed that they were successful in proving that Al-Timimi never urged anyone to commit acts of violence and any testimonies against him are only due to the government witnesses’ strong urge to utter anything dictated by the government in order to avoid lengthy prison sentences.

In conclusion, the jury convicted Al-Timimi because of his non-violent and anomalous views – views that may even rise to the level of “hate speech,” yet are still fundamentally protected by our First Amendment rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution. Though the recordings of these views were played excessively in court by an “over zealous” prosecution, the actual facts of the September 16th meeting do not seem to have been fairly and adequately considered by the jury. Perhaps, the jury failed to make that distinction thus resulting in Al-Timimi's fate. The jury seems to have convicted Al-Timimi not on the basis of evidence but on emotion buying wholesale into the fear and paranoia built up around Islam and Muslims in the days immediately following 9/11 – one may even refer to this as “Islamophobia.” All of this has left American Muslims with a serious quandary! What are they really doing in the United States? Maybe Al-Timimi was right! It is time for them to make “Hijra” –or for lack of better words – GET OUT OF HERE! GO BACK TO YOUR COUNTRY!

The author lives on the East Cost United States and has watched both the "Paintball" case and the Al-Timimi case closely.

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